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Who Killed Gladys Werlich?
A Medical-Legal Moral Dilemma
Jeanne Marie Scott

Miss Scott is a 1969 graduate of the University of Detroit School of
Law. She is a former assistant attorney general and spent six years as a
staff attorney for The Catholic Hospital Association. She is currently
engaged in the private practice of law in Washington, D.C., specializing
in research and consultive services to the health care industry .

Introduction
THE CRIME:
An elderly woman is viciously beaten by a gang of young thugs and
left dying in the streets of a major American city.
THE MEDICAL-MORAL CRISIS:
The use of artificial life support units sustain the victim. Brain activity
continues. Prognosis for recovery: none.
MEDICAL DECISION:
The respirator is discontinued and death occurs within the hour.
THE COURTS:
At trial , the defense raises the argument: "This was not a case of
brain-death. " Inference: The defendant did not kill the victim: the
doctors who disconnected the respirator did .
THE QUESTION:
"Who killed Gladys Werlich?"

On one of those surprisingly warm days which can occur even in
mid-winter Washington, D.C., 85-year-old Gladys Hinckley Werlich,
one of the last pre-World War II society matrons who had made that
city such a social center in the past, and who still lived a vibrant and
independent life, not relying on her children or the public for support,
was making her way home after visiting some of her more invalided
friends. It was Jan . 13, 1976, and she was hurrying along Corcoran
Avenue, Northwest, a vintage Washington street just then beginning to
show signs of the renewal and revitalization which are shaping the
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capital city's inner core. Suddenly, from behind, she was viciously
attacked by four youths, one of whom clubbed her over the head,
grabbed her purse, and disappeared into a nearby alley.
Gladys Werlich was rushed to the intensive-care unit at George
Washington University Medical Center; there she lay unconscious, the
damage to her skull and brain extensive and irremediable. Unable to
speak or move, she was placed on a respirator to assist her breathing
and to take the pressure off her other body systems while the full
damage could be assessed and evaluated. For five days she lay in this
comatose state. On the sixth day, after consultation among her physicians and after discussing the matter with her family who had been
gathered at her bedside, the neurosurgeon assigned to her case turned
off the respirator support unit. Twenty minutes later, Gladys Werlich
was dead.
The Criminal Trial
Arrests were made on the basis of witness descriptions of four
youths who had been seen loitering in the area shortly before the
attack. One of these youths, Leroy Parker, was charged with the
felony murder of Gladys Werlich, a capital offense under District of
Columbia law.
Trial began in the D.C. Superior Court in February, 1977. The
Public Defender's office, assigned to counsel Parker during the trial,
made numerous preliminary motions. 1 Among them was the argument
that Leroy Parker had not legally caused the death of Mrs. Werlich,
but rather that her death had been precipitated by the unwarranted
and improper action of the neurosurgeon in disconnecting her lifesupport units on that sixth day after the attack. The trial judge denied
these motions and 19-year-old Leroy Parker was found guilty of
second-degree murder and sentenced to six to 18 years in prison.

The Appeal Process

In briefs filed before the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia the first week of September, 1978, this same
question of "Who caused the death of Gladys Werlich?" has been
raised anew, and with a greater vigor and potential significance not
only to Leroy Parker and the physicians who treated her, but also to
the very fabric of U.S. criminal law.
Unlike other criminal prosecutions for murder where respirators
had been turned off, all parties this time agree that at the time of her
death, Mrs. Werlich's brain was functioning and that the minimum
criteria for "brain death" had not yet been met. She was alive. But
what she was, according to Dr. Michael W. Dennis, the neurosurgeon
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who had disconnected the support unit, was a patient "who could not
talk, a patient who could not think, could not see, could not appreciate anything in the world." It was (and still is) Dr. Dennis ' opinion
that Gladys Werlich had suffered irreversible brain damage during that
attack on Corcoran Avenue, and that she could not have survived even
if extraordinary means such as the respirator had been continuously
employed . 2
In its brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, the Public Defender's Office argued that the neurosurgeon had failed to follow accepted
medical practices when he decided to disconnect the respiratory unit
and that he had made a legally improper "value judgment as to t he
quality of life" facing Mrs. Werlich, not the question of biological or
medical life itself, which was the only thing he was legally and professionally competent to decide. Thus, according to the Defender's argument, the act of the physician sufficiently broke the causal chain of
events,3 to exonerate the Defender's client from guilt for any homicide. At most, goes this argument, Leroy Parker might be found guilty
of assault or robbery, but not murder.
The Legal Debate
The Appeals decision in the Werlich death case is not expected until
after the first of this year, 1979. But the decision has already precipitated considerable legal, as well as medical and philosophical debate.
The District of Columbia Medical Society has set up a comm ittee to
evaluate the role of the physician in those treatment situations where
death may be considered imminent, but where established brain -death
criteria have clearly not yet been met.
Lawyers, specializing in the intersectional areas of medicine and law,
have raised considerable question as to the traditional legal concepts
of "causality" which date back to America's English common law
heritage. What, may we ask, is the purpose of a criminal statute that
can be frustrated by unheard of and unbelievable medical advances to
a society which had created t hat law 800 years ago? Or, for that
matter, just ten years ago? Victims of crim e, like Mrs. Werlich, would
have died on the operating table just a few years ago. Now, semb lances
of life can be maintained - and are we to free the criminal assailants
because of this scien tific progress?
When decisions are made by physicians as to the termination of
life-support treatment, these must be made in full consideration of the
views and wishes of the family and the patient, and as a humane and
reasonable response to the irreversible cond itions that are deemed to
exist and the vestiges of life remaining. No single set of criteria is
sufficien t, but in each case the court can establish a standard of
reasonableness, sufficient to satisfy both the crim inal law, the rights of
the defendant, and the needs of society.
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New Law or Old
Blind adherence by the law to previously accepted doctrines such as
"proximate causality" and "intervening causality" cannot be allowed
to frustrate the original purpose of t he law. An error was most likely
made by the trial court in the original case of U.S. u. Parker. At that
time the trial judge refused to give the jury any evidence or in structions as to either the medical condition of Mrs. Werlich (an instruction
requested by the defendant) nor did he give the jury any evidence or
instructions as to the problems facing the treating physicians, the
emotional crisis caused to the victim 's family, nor to the previously
expressed wishes of the patient herself. (Mrs. Werlich had , only a few
weeks prior to the attack, executed a so-called " living will," expressing
her wish not to be needlessly maintained on artificial or extraordinary
medical devices.) This error by the trial court may , in fact, prove fatal
to the prosecution's case made against Leroy Parker. Should are-trial
be ordered, I would h ope the appellate court would face the issues
directly and leave some instructions and guidelines that might help the
jury in a future case fully weigh the facts and circumstances. The
appeals court must not shy away from establishing a new standard of
legal guilt or innocence compatible with advances in medical science
and the full meaning and purpose of the criminal law.
A Proposal
Such a standard might take the form of a model jury instruction
along the following lines:
If you, the ju ry , find as a matter of fact that the medical cond ition of the
victim to th e all eged cl·ime, and as a result of the acts of the defendant, was
irreversible according to current medical standards; and if you find, as a
matter of fact, that but for the use of artificial respiratory or other life·
.,support units, the victim would die with in a foreseeable period of time
because of t h e injuries attr ibu ted to the acts of the defendant; and if you
fi nd t hat the treating physicians to the victim and the family of the victim
have acted humanely and reasonably in terminating the use of such artific ial respiratory or other means of Iife·support , th en you may, as a matter
of fact, find that the resu ltant death of the victim h ad been directly and
immediately caused by the criminal acts of the defendant, and you may find
t he d efendant guilty of hom ic id e as requested by t h e Peop le."

The law has never pretended to be perfect. All too often it has had
to be dragged " kicking and screaming" into new areas and to break
old, no longer meaningful, molds. The question of legal causality in
perpetration of a criminal act is considered a material fact generally to
be decided by a jury. The judge and the court bear the burden and
responsibility of deciding which evidence the jury will hear and how it
will be instructed, as a matter of law, to evaluate that evidence. New
law is needed to meet the exigencies of modern society. Such homicide cases as the Werlich case, can be anticipated to occur with much
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greater frequency. We can only hope that the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals, hearing this case in the first instance, will not back away
from breaking the old pattern. Justice demands a recognition of new
conditions. Our society can accept nothing less.

REFERENCES
1. Among the other motions made by the defense , and denied b y the trial
court, was a motion to instruct the jury on the ancient legal maxim of a "year and
a day." This rule would have the effect of exonerating from liability , under either
criminal or negligence law , any defendant where the victim survived for more than
a year and a day after the injury-causing incident. By law , and only through this
legal artifice , the victim was presumed to have died from other causes. In this
modern era , survival in a greatly debilitated and still fatal state may easily be
prolonged in excess of a year.
2. It was Dr. Dennis' opinion that Mrs. Werlich would have lived but a few day s
longer in any event. The decision to terminate her treatment was made at the
request of the family with the approval of the entire medic al team treating Mrs.
Werlich. If the "year and a day " argument had been permitted before the jury ,
further instructions would have to have accompanied it to allow the jury to make
a "factual" determination as to when Mrs. Werlich would have died , with or
without m edical intervention. It was the defense's hope to raise the Karen Ann
Quinlan situation to show that " life" migh t be maintained for years yet to come .

3. According to Black·s Law Dictionary (4th Edition), " proximate causality" is
defined as: " That which, in a natural and continuous seq uence , unbroken by a ny
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the resu lt
would not have occurred. " The defense 's argument was obviously to show that
the medical intervention broke the causal chain of eve nts, thus taking the d efendant "off the hook," so to speak .
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